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In his 'Attempt at a Self-Criticism', Nietzsche defines the
condition of the Hellenes as a 'neurosis of health'.' The
focus of this paper will be on examining the Stoics'
conception of health of mind, and their ideas about the
appropriate treatment of sickness. This diagnosis of Stoic
moral philosophy will be given in relation to the one offered
by Martha Nussbaum in her book The Therapy of Desire. Her
assessment involves looking at differences in the therapies
endorsed by orthodox Stoicism and by Seneca in his present-
ation of Medea. In order to establish whether Nussbaum's
assessment is accurate, there will need to be investigation of
the Stoic's basic assumption about reality, and of the account
of perception and health which follows on from this. I will
argue that there are tensions in the accounts given by the
Stoics, Seneca, and Nussbaum, but that these tensions, while in
conflict, are not beyond a therapy of desire.
The focus of Nussbaum's book is on approaches to ethics
in Hellenistic philosophy. Three of the major schools of this
period - Epicurean, Sceptic, and Stoic - are linked by their
'practical and compassionate' approaches to philosophy,
driven by a common ethical aim of addressing human
problems. The kinds of issues primarily concerning them
were, she thinks, those bound up with people's emotions
(pathe) - issues including 'the fear of death, love and
sexuality, anger and aggression'. In dealing with the sorts of
troubles these can pose, philosophy is seen to require
techniques and strategies other than those traditionally used
for more detached and intellectual pursuits. Unlike the
Platonists, whom Nussbaum portrays as 'calm' dialecticians,
with their descriptions of how the good is distant from people
and their philosophical procedures 'suited to the good rather
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than to human beings', these other thinkers are likened to
physicians embracing a 'newly complex understanding of
human psychology' that is committed to making people
good. Through the use of 'interactive, rhetorical, [and]
literary' devices, they sought to address and treat people's
deepest, most disturbing emotions?
In the writings of the Epicureans, Sceptics, and Stoics, there
is an appeal to an analogy between philosophy and medicine.
Corresponding to medicine's concern with sickness and
disease of the body is philosophy's concern with sickness
and disease of the soul, and corresponding to the doctor's
remedies are the philosopher's 'therapeutic' arguments,
specifically prescribed to heal the soul's ailments. These
ailments of the soul are held to be produced by false beliefs
which are somehow tied up with feelings and desires.3 As
Nussbaum notes, the Stoics developed the medical analogy in
most detail. In their case, health is the condition of the good
soul while sickness is the condition of the bad. Their concept
of the good or wise man (the Stoic sage) whose soul is in an
ideal state of virtue was, according to A. A. Long, heralded as
a paradigm arrived at through the Stoic's inference about the
ultimate rationality of the universe.4
The Stoics, Long continues, developed a theory of reality
in terms of two basic principles: the 'active principle', which
is variously referred to as Nature, God, and Logos (reason);
and the 'passive principle' - matter, which is 'substance
without qualitative determinism'. Chrysippus identified logos
with pneuma (a compound of fire and air, literally 'breath'),
a dynamic source 'shaping' matter by thoroughly pervading
it and being completely interpenetrated with it. By
identifying the human soul with pneuma (pervading the more
physically dense frame of the body's flesh, blood, and
sinews), the Stoics were able to describe it as rational
'through and through'. This 'vehicle of logos' connects
individuals to the intelligent and life-giving force of the
cosmos, being the means by which 'the universal causal
principle takes on particular identity within each individual
man'. The Stoics could then provide an account of the
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function of human beings in terms of their part in fulfilling
Nature's rational purpose of creating and maintaining the
harmony and equilibrium of the whole. The human soul,
being endowed with the faculty of speech and a 'governing
principle' (hegemonikon) which houses powers of the mind
(though identified with the region of the heart), is uniquely
placed to take part consciously and actively in the rational
processes of the universe. Through their logos, a person can
'formulate statements which mirror cosmic events'.
'Language', for the Stoics, 'is a part of nature and provides
man with the medium to express his relationship with the
world' .5
In turning one's thoughts to the workings of nature by
studying the three inter-related 'parts' of the Stoic corpus -
ethics, physics, and logic - a person engages in active
perception of the external world which is at the very same
time the active and articulate perception of the inter-related
aspects of self. Humans and animals were both thought to
possess souls, and the rationality of adult humans was
explained by the higher degree of complexity and flexibility
in the pneumatic tension of their souls. But the Stoics also
talk of weaker and stronger tensions in the souls of men.
Seneca speaks of the virtuous man's soul as displaying
'orderliness', 'consistency' and 'harmony', as his 'happy
life ... flows on smoothly, complete in its own self-mastery'
(Seneca Letters 120.3-5). With knowledge as his very dispos-
ition, the Stoic sage has the tension of his soul mirroring the
right attunement of cosmic Logos which can be understood
in terms of symphonia - the four primary virtues and their
constituents inter-related in a structure analogous to that of
the four tetrachords and their constituents in music.6 In
contrast, the Stoics describe phenomenologically the physical
movement and disposition of the vicious and inferior soul,
which is 'sickly' in tenor and has its flow impeded by
excessive 'contraction ... shrinkage ... stretching ... [and]
swelling', distinctive of the 'flutterings' of passion (SYF
3.391).7
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Passion or emotion is, for the Stoics, a form of impulse,
with impulse being viewed as an 'act of assent' and defined
as a 'movement of the mind towards something involved in
action' (Aetius 4.21.1-2). Impulse is described as being
'directed at' predicates which are in a sense contained in the
propositions assented to. Emotion is understood as 'impulse
which is excessive' (SYF 3.479), involving 'an irrational
movement of the soul' (SYF 2.899). The differences between
the perception of the wise and the perception of the foolish
stem largely from the fact that the latter is characterised by
these excessive impulses, and by looking at the Stoic's
anatomization of the passions it can be shown how they were
construed as being intimately connected.
Stobaeus and Andronicus classify the passions under four
genera: appetite, fear, pleasure, and distress. Each of these in
turn receives a definition characterising its excess in terms of
both a false judgement containing a predicate of very good
or very bad (SYF 3.466;480), and a 'concomitant psychos-
omatic' movement. Stobaeus speaks of pleasure and distress
as resulting from appetite and fear, with the latter two being
in relation to things in the future, and the former two being in
relation to things at hand which were formerly impending.
According to their definitions, appetite is or involves a
judgement that something in the future is good or valuable,
concomitant with a movement of irrational 'stretching
[desire], or pursuit'; fear is or involves a judgement that
something in the future is bad, characterised by an irrational
'shrinking [aversion] or avoidance'; pleasure is or involves a
judgement that something in the present is good or valuable,
accompanied by an irrational 'swelling' or elation; and
distress is or involves a judgement that something at hand is
bad, along with an irrational 'contraction' or depression.s In
all four cases, the persons experiencing the emotion are
prompted to believe that they are right in their perception.
Along with the four basic genera, the Stoics also recog-
nised species belonging to these. Anger, for instance, is held
to be a species of appetite and is defined in terms of 'intense
sexual desires, cravings and yearnings, love of pleasures and
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riches and honours, and the like' (SVF 3.394). As can be
seen from the last of these manifestations, anger is associated
with another category of emotion, namely pleasure.
Chrysippus presents anger (and each of the other passions) as
a judgment that is 'fresh' (that is. very recent), 'false, bad,
and contrary to reason'(SVF 3.459, 481).9 He refers to the
Medea of Euripides' play in order to illustrate the way anger
is bound up with false belief or judgement about the value of
an external uncontrolled object. In ascribing inappropriately
high and non-replaceable value to her husband, Medea is
seen to have a false belief. And the badness of this belief is
demonstrated when, in losing him, it gives rise to an
alternative belief that coincides with anger and the decision to
avenge her betrayal. lO
In discussing Chrysippus on the identification of false
beliefs with emotions, Nussbaum focusses attention on his
account of the 'disorderly kinetic element' being contained
in the belief (SVF 3.394), rather than resulting from it (as
Zeno held). She insists that this 'dynamic conception of
practical knowing or judging' radically distinguishes the
Stoics' account from the prior tradition of viewing judge-
ment as the 'cool inert act of intellect set over against a prop-
osition ,II. Departing from this 'static' conception, thought to
be endorsed by the same tradition that adopts a tripartite
model of the soul, Nussbaum points to the way Chrysippus
describes the oscillation of the whole soul when literally in
the 'throes' of passions. He speaks of the soul as 'turning
and shifting as a whole', 'not the conflict and civil war of two
parts, but the turning of a single reason in two different
directions, which escape our notice on account of the
sharpness and swiftness of the change' (SVF 3.459). By
equating belief and desire, Chrysippus illustrates how the
inter-related passions can be housed in a thoroughly rational
soul. In articulating a proposition, an excessive impulse
involves reason. And the shifting of passions, as exhibited by
Medea's oscillating between anger, grief, and malicious
pleasure, is explained in Nussbaum by the claim that all of
these are 'identical with judgements that ascribe high and
non-replaceable value to Jason' .12 On Nussbaum's account,
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Medea's judgement about the importance of her husband is
'one basic condition ... [which] naturally takes on a kaleido-
scopic multiplicity, as she goes through the various judge-
ments that are part of this condition'. Medea's passions
differ only in the precise content of the proposition. There is
the 'generic' evaluative belief that certain external unstable
items are highly valuable, the more 'concrete' one that Jason
is highly valuable, and then a further 'specific occurrent
belief that he has wronged her. The different passions which
characterise this latter belief (and which in turn give
expression to the earlier ones) are then viewed as almost
synonymous, being simply different ways of articulating a
single judgement in a range of circumstances,I3
From here it requires only a small step for Nussbaum to
account for the Stoic belief that having just one of the
passions entails acquiring many (and perhaps all), and her
belief that this position led the Stoics to practise a therapy of
desire directed at the extirpation of all passions. Whereas she
reports Diogenes Laertius as saying 'Wise men are harmless:
for they do no harm, either to others or to themselves' (her
translation of Diogenes Laertius 7.123), persons who allow
themselves to have even apparently mild emotions like pity
are seen to be unable to guarantee that these will not lead on
to stronger and more violent ones. Fate might reverse the
situation, making the pitier into the pitied, a turn of events
likely to trigger off such emotions as astonishment, envy,
grief, and even murderous anger. The Stoics' interest in
Medea lay in its presentation of motives and movements
which drive an escalation of passions to a tragic climax.
According to Nussbaum, such interest (or rather, concern)
persuaded them of the need actively to 'root out' the
passions.
In order to explain the different ways in which the
perception of the wise and the foolish related to reason, the
Stoics distinguished between 'right' and 'wrong' reason.
Using the sage as the criterion of rationality, being the
paradigm of 'right reason' (SVF 3.560), the Stoics went on
to link the 'unsound logos' of the foolish with the weakness
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of tension in their souls. The weak reason and 'assent' of
excessive impulse is a manifestation of the uncontrolled and
unlimited turnings of a soul lacking tension to restrain and
moderate. Lloyd emphasises this idea by referring to emotion
as misdescription, where 'describing is how the agent's
reason manifests itself. And he also considers the way a
person's description is bound up with their action. 14 In her
analysis of Seneca's Medea, Fyfe observes that the protag-
onist's language is 'a catalyst for her actions', while also
'direct(ing) her emotions' .15 Deliberation about killing her
children persuades her to the act (11.937ff),16 a decision
further encouraged by Medea's belief that the way to get at
her husband is through their children. Using the analogy of a
hole in having Medea speak of 'the tender place where I shall
wound him, the perfect spot to strike' (11.570-1), Seneca's
language is figuratively suggestive; the metaphor, as
Nussbaum points out, later metamorphoses into the gaping
wound felt by Jason once the two children are murdered and
a third is struck out of Medea's womb. I7 If a Stoic were to try
to help Medea, he or she would need to make her see that the
judgements she has used in apprehending her situation are
false and indicative of weak reasoning. In order to 'tone up'
her logos, a Stoic would have her exercise it and so attune it
to accord with sound and fit reason.
As mentioned above, the Stoics sought to improve the
health of a patient's soul by having them actively engage in
self-perception. This involves (rational) perception of the
external world through synthesising appearances by use of
analogy, magnification, diminution, transposition, combin-
ation, transition, privation, and nature (in the case of forming
the idea of something just and good) (SYF 2.87). These are
what make possible knowledge of the four basic virtues:
practical wisdom, justice, moderation, and courage (SYF
3.26). And, as noted by Long, each of the virtues was
understood in terms of knowledge: courage, for instance,
being 'knowledge of things which should be endured' (SYF
3.285).
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The virtues were characterised in terms of theorems
(principles of conduct) common to them all, leading
Stobaeus to remark that 'whoever has one has all, and
whoever acts in accordance with one acts in accordance with
all' (SVF 3.280). A just action, for instance, while not
(perhaps) properly describable as brave, must not be perf-
ormed with cowardice, immoderation, or folly. And, to ensure
this, the Stoics argued that the person acting justly (or
courageously, or moderately, or prudently) must have grasp-
ed the theorems proper to the other virtues as well. In the case
of justice, the primary perspective is of the theory of
'individual deserts', and the secondary perspective is of the
theory of what falls under the other virtues (SVF 3.280).
Regarding 'observation' and 'comparison' of repeated
acts as antecedents of the knowledge of virtue, Cicero and
Seneca both speak of analogy as the means of its realisation
(SVF 3.72; Seneca utters 120.3-5). Cicero writes that 'when
the mind by means of analogy has climbed up from those
things which are in accordance with nature, it then arrives at
the conception of the good' (that is, the knowledge of virtue)
(SVF 3.72). He then goes on to liken apprehending the good
through its 'own specific nature' to apprehending the
sweetness of honey through its own specific kind of flavour,
and not by comparison with other things (SVF 3.72). And in
Cicero there is discussion of how the analogy with bodily
health teaches us of the existence of health of mind, without
showing us what health of mind is. Content is given to this
abstract conception by 'observing and comparing the
behaviours of individual men' - those who seem to display
virtue in one area but vice in another, and those who are seen
to exhibit virtue consistently in all circumstances and at all
times (Seneca utters 120.3-5, 8-11). The Stoics' veneration
of Socrates (though not specifically the Socrates of Plato's
dialogues), with his dispassionate demeanour and mastery of
virtue, suggests that they may have regarded him as sage
material.
Looking through the surviving fragments of the three parts
of the Stoic corpus, it becomes clear that these philos-ophers
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made every effort to apply the principles they espoused to
their own activity of writing. In speaking of the soul they
sought to demonstrate its dynamic nature by using
phenomenological descriptions. In discussing how
knowledge of the good is arrived at through the persistent
observation and processing of rational appearances, they
would give copious examples and think up vivid and
illuminating analogies and metaphors. While in trying to
convey the interconnections between ethics, physics, and
logic, they even managed to enliven philosophy into an
organic unity. Diogenes Laertius, for instance, tells of how
they compared philosophy to a living being, 'likening logic
to bones and sinews, ethics to fleshier parts, and physics to the
soul' (Diogenes Laertius 7.39-41). But perhaps most striking
of all is the fact that this thorough-going energy and
devotion to presenting definitions, descriptions, divisions, and
even derivations (the Stoics were keen etymologists), were
directed at promoting the critical need to restrain the passions
by straining towards right reason. Dialectic and rhetoric are
used as a means of persuading an audience of the importance
of a given set of values, methods designed to bring consensus
through offering the level of specificity gauged as sufficient
to convince a particular type of audience. In the Stoics' case,
as Nussbaum notes, their attempts to convince people of the
need to be critical of their judgements cruciall~ depended on
the use of 'concrete' narratives and examples. 1
It is possible to demonstrate further how such strategies are
closely in line with the Stoics' view of right action by
highlighting the emphasis they placed, not only on the
general content of an acceptable act, but on how (or why)
that act is performed. Nussbaum explains this by referring to
the Stoics' claim that 'an action must be done as the wise
person would do it, with the thoughts and feelings appropr-
iate to virtue' .19 Being a 'highly contextual and particular
matter', this is seen to require more than 'general content
rules' containing 'what a person ought to do'. What is
needed is a set of procedures 'guaranteeing' that, 'whatever
the particular situation', a person could 'fulfil the whole
gamut of appropriate acts' (Nussbaum's translation of
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Epictetus 95.5). In the Phaedrus, Plato investigates the issues
relating to practical skills (especially at 27Id-272a), and there
are analogies with practical skills in the writings of the
Stoics.2o Both teacher and pupil, doctor and patient, require
practical skills (though whether the same or different skills is
a moot point). And in the Stoic practitioner's laying out of
procedures for subscribers, 'philosophical explication' is
always accompanied by example.
At this point, however, there is a tension in the Stoic
profession. The Stoic professes to provide arguments suited
to a therapy for strong passions, like desire. The various
procedures, strategies, and techniques they offer are all
geared to healing those suffering from the illness that is
passion. And yet the vigour and determination with which
they throw themselves at this project cannot properly be
described as objective or dispassionate. Nussbaum points to
this in her discussion of the Stoics on anger and on the need
for a 'we-them mentality' which sees the angry persons dist-
ance themselves from the object of rage. 'Greek Stoic
harshness' is, she argues, 'strangely like a kind of anger: an
aggression against the defects and passions of human beings,
born of the exalted hope of perfect blameless virtue' .21 Given
that Nussbaum so closely identifies the different emotions, it
is natural for her to speak of anger and aggression inter-
changeably. But even if this were objected to, it is still the
case that the Stoics display a genuine desire for virtue - a
desire based on their judgements of value. Through the use
of analogies and other exempla - their means of demon-
strating while also assuaging the viciousness of passion - the
Stoic cure looks to be treating vice with vice. There appears
to be a crucial ambiguity in the meaning of the therapy of
desire.
In response to the question of whether the treatment of the
passions ought to involve their extirpation or merely their
moderation, Nussbaum points to Seneca as saying that 'our
people drive out the passions altogether [expellunt] ;
[whereas] the Peripatetics moderate them' (Nussbaum
translation of Epictetus 116.1; SVF 3.443). The violent
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image of having them 'pulled out root and branch' is invok-
ed (Lanctantius, SVF 3.444, 447). But Nussbaum wishes to
distinguish Seneca's own position from this impassioned
extreme. She argues that his attitude towards healing is one
indicative of mercy, not anger. By presenting his philosoph-
ical ideas in the context of tragic plays and letters, Seneca is
able to focus on and depict more keenly the particularity of
. the thoughts and feelings tied up with human perception and
action. And from this vantage point Nussbaum maintains that
he is better able to construe, and therefore judge, the tensions
in the Stoics' account of reality.
Seneca, in re-telling the Greek tragedy of Medea, departed
from the orthodox Stoic's writing of philosophical treatises.
Chrysippus had alluded to the original play of Euripides, as
we saw, and he and Cleanthes are known for their fondness
for quoting from the ancient Greek poets. And Chrysippus
and Cleanthes are only two of a number of Stoics who
devoted whole treatises to the subject of poetry. Nussbaum, in
her article, 'Poetry and Passion: two Stoic views', discusses
the apparent paradox this presents in the Stoa.22 How can the
Stoic attitude towards the passions be reconciled with their
affection for poetry?23 She offers two possible answers: first,
that those like Chrysippus, Zeno, Seneca, and Epictetus held
that poetry could educate the rational faculty of soul (the
hegemon ikon) and, second, that those like Posidonious and
Diogenes of Babylon - defenders of the tripartite model of
the soul - thought that the irrational part could not be
'modified by modification of judgements', but must instead
be 'harmonized' and balanced through non-rational means
(with poetry and music being regarded as those means).
These two reasons are convincingly argued by Nussbaum,
but in considering whether they provide the whole
explanation for the Stoics' use of poetry it will be necessary
to think about their conception of what counts as poetry. This
issue will be looked at after giving some assessment of
Seneca's Medea in terms of the notion of a therapy of desire.
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The chapter in Nussbaum focussing on this drama is
entitled 'Serpents of the Soul'. and the snake is the play's
central image. They are 'emblems of Medea' - of her erotic
love, of her hideous sins, of her charms and powers of magic,
and of her connection with death and renewal. Of these
snakes, Nussbaum draws attention to one that is 'lethal and
erotic', while also having an 'affinity for poetry or song' .24
Darting his 'forked' tongue, this snake 'seeks those to whom
he can come bringing death' (11.687-8). And yet, on hearing
Medea's song, he is transfixed and, enchanted, twines his
'swollen body' into circling coils (11.686-90). Having been
lured away from other 'scaly creatures in chaotic mass'
(1.688), this serpent winds itself into orbes, reflecting the
creative intelligence of the cosmos (11.689-696). In drawing
the connection between the serpent's movement and that of
the heavens, the serpent is seen as enacting the creation of a
world by 'compelling fluid matter to take on form' .25
For the Stoics, the world was created through the inter-
penetration of dynamic pneuma and passive matter. This was
also how they conceived of the formation of new worlds.
Zeno refers to pneuma as a vital fluid spreading through
living organisms and providing the means by which logos is
transmitted by parent to offspring. The Stoics, furthermore,
associated logos with fire, regarding both as basic elements of
the universe (Diogenes Laertius 7.136). In discussing the
significance of fire in Seneca's play, Nussbaum notes that,
like the snake, it is a symbol relating to Medea. Her
grandfather is the Sun who sowed her family's seed, and is
the one who will watch as Corinth is consumed by flames - its
'double boundaries of land dividing seas being joined', no
longer to delay passing ships (11.30-36). The images of both
flame and snake, with their 'lethal suddenness' and 'fluid
supple shape' are primarily identified with Medea's passion
and desire.26
What have these images got to do with the therapy of
desire? Again, Nussbaum provides the clue. In considering
the serpent with an affinity for poetry, she alludes to the fact
that 'Seneca's alliterative poetry has, too, an affinity for
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him'. And in a later section she speaks of how Seneca's play
takes on the 'suddenness' and 'passion' of the snake.
Assuming a 'serpentine doubleness', it twines its way 'betw-
een the moral world and the world of love', forked tongue
flickering and wondering whom to kill. Like the snake, 'both
hideous and wonderful', Seneca weaves his narrative between
passion and morality, displaying the ambiguities and tensions
in bothY
The Senecan Chorus, taken by Nussbaum to be the
mouthpiece of Stoic morality, dreams of 'unlimited progress
and harmony between man and nature' (11.364-379). But its
telling of the unhappy fate met by the Argonauts - punished
for their daring and progress in the conquest of the sea -
suggests a vindictive Nature jealous of man's advances and
encroachments. And parallelling this is the blind hope - not
only of the Chorus, but of Jason, Creon, and the Nurse - that
Medea's passion will not unleash destruction. Blind. because
each expresses the conviction that she will take horrifying
revenge, but each fails to act on this. Creon, for instance,
declares 'she is plotting mischief, I have no doubt. She wants
revenge, will stop at nothing' (1.180). And, even once he has
granted Medea the short reprieve, says to her 'I don't trust
you. You'll use the time for mischief (1.294).
The Stoic test of human power is 'deliberate' action (SVF
2.984). But in what sense are these characters acting deliber-
ately when they give Medea the reprieve they know will end
in disaster? Is their compassion for the woman (at least in
Creon's and Jason's cases) stronger than their concern for
their own lives and for those of their loved ones? Like those
people whom Seneca speaks of in the Letters whose 'badness
sometimes takes the appearance of rectitude' (Seneca Letters
120.5), these characters are prima jacie more reasonable and
more stoical than Medea, but could also be seen as more
foolish. Medea is, after all, in both Euripides and Seneca,
depicted as acting deliberately, albeit deliberately against
reason. Like a good rhetor, she has the practical skills to sway
and persuade the judgements of others, being able to
prostitute her reason and emotions in order to convince and,
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in so doing, advance her cause. The Stoics themselves may be
thought of as doing the same thing in their use of dialectical
arguments and phenomenological descriptions - though, it
would be hoped, in a different cause.
And yet Seneca in his play portrays what looks to be a
causal connection between 'hope-in-fear' and hope
frustrated. 28 All of the characters have hopes and fears, and
all of them employ techniques of rhetoric to try and secure
the former and evade the latter. 29 In Medea's case, her
project of revenge, though sinister, is not without justification.
And it is her passionate appeal which solicits our sympathy,
as it does the sympathy of the poetic serpent. We, like
Epictetus, admire her for her greatness of spirit, the very
thing displayed through these appeals. But it would be
disturbing for a Stoic to hear Medea proclaiming that her
'spirit' and 'rage' are the two things that nobody can take
from her (11.178-9), for the Stoics held the opposite view of
virtue. 3o And equally if not more disturbing would be their
hearing her speak of having 'reached a truth, a terrible and
incontrovertible truth' from which she takes 'a kind of joy'
(11.1010-12), when this joy and truth are brought about by
her multiple killings. It is joy that they upheld as the most
cherished of the Stoic 'good feelings', while terror, being a
species of fear, was held to be very far from grasping at truth.
What is this truth? Is it the discovery that her beliefs were
in error? On Nussbaum's reading of the Stoics (but not of
Seneca), this would appear to be the only explanation. A
Stoic would have it that Medea's actions are motivated by
false beliefs - a false belief in the 'high and non-replaceable'
value of her husband and the false belief that she has been
wronged by him. But is it solely a love for Jason that
influences her actions? In Euripides especially, but also in
Seneca, Medea expresses concern for reputation and
renown.3) Seneca has her boast that she shall 'devastate, [and]
wreak such havoc as men and women shall speak of for a
thousand years' (11.336-8). Like Neptune's wrath at the sea-
farers' mastery, Medea's rage at having yielded to an
unfaithful mortal explodes into a retaliation aimed at showing
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him, and everyone alse, the immensity and greatness of her
powers. And, like the ocean's oscillation between beckoning
smoothness and unrelenting wildness (11.367-8;334-7),
Medea's passions swing to and fro, in the manner depicted
by the Stoic's phenomenological descriptions. Medea turns
from wishing to devise the most savage vengeance imagin-
able, for example, to hoping that Jason may live on to
remember her (11.115-50).
Nussbaum makes reference to this tender wish for Jason's
well being in her discussion of Seneca's playas an argument
against love. She provides arguments to illustrate that
Seneca's fear derives, not from the idea that Medea has a
false belief about Jason, but from the idea that love can itself
tum violent, given that it involves passions.32 And yet despite
arguing that his driving concern rests with the potential
violence bound up with love, Nussbaum thinks that Seneca
endorses an attitude of mercy and acceptance of imperfection
rather than a harsh and 'tireless insistence on perfect moral
health'. The ambivalence towards Stoicism expressed in this
play indicates, she thinks, understanding of and empathy with
the difficulties involved in trying to live well. Nussbaum
points to Seneca's ambivalence about the Stoic ideal of
rooting out the passions and about living a life 'without the
false belief in the value of externals'. The demands of the
former are seen as obsessive and unrealistic, while Nussbuam
sees Seneca's depiction of the Stoic ideal of existence as one
of self-centred, inactive 'sluggishness' (among the very
qualities admonished as 'morally vicious' [Epiclelus 74.30]).
And, while she then goes on to say that spectators would be
'erotically drawn to Medea's greatness of soul', she does not
focus on Seneca's ambivalence toward the attitude of mercy,
or on the related matter of his ambiguous presentation of
characters.33
Turning to the latter issue first: as suggested earlier, Seneca
sometimes endows Medea with Stoic deliberateness and
rhetorical prowess while lading other characters with a weak
capacity to reason, leaving them unable to confront and see
through Medea's supplications. Yet it would be misleading to
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assert that, in spite of appearances, Seneca views Medea as
almost Stoic, and the others as false imposters. It cannot, for
example, be asserted that the Nurse's expressions of Stoic
sentiment in counselling her mistress to gain self-control and
calmness of mind (11.406;453) are merely a cover for the
nursing of her mistress's ailment, as seems more clearly
evident in her earlier prompting. 'Hide your grievances', she
initially advises, 'Mute them to fury held within yourself.
Endure without a sound wounds that cut deep, and bide your
time. Maintain a level head; then you will have the power to
repay. Your anger hurts when it is camouflaged; if you
proclaim your hatred, it will lose the space it needs for
vengeance, and the time' (1.150). For all the heart-wrenching
soul searching that characterises this ailment - soul searching
that involves the very skills in rhetoric outlined above -
Medea, like the others, displays self-delusion and a lack of
self-awareness. Christopher Gill speaks of how she deliber-
ately rejects reason, but having given herself over to a state of
pathos, is unable to choose 'not to disobey reason'. 34 In fact,
each of the characters can be seen to display very many of
the Stoic vices and very many of the virtues.35
Nussbaum writes of Seneca's uncertainty about the merits
of Stoic aims and practices, but in depicting Medea as the
anti-Stoical hero and the Chorus as the voice of Stoic
orthodoxy she fails to account for an even deeper ambiv-
alence. Seneca's paradoxical portrayal of each character
evidences the paradoxical nature of Stoic aims and practices
themselves. The conflict is not one between Stoic and anti-
Stoic, but is rather within Stoicism itself. It is unclear who is
virtuous and who vicious, nor is it clear that virtue does not
serve vice, and vice versa. As Plato demonstrates the difficulty
in distinguishing the lover from the non-lover in the
Phaedrus, it is here shown that no sure marks exist to
determine the good from the bad, and on the Stoic's own
terms. Nussbaum states that Seneca calls for mercy rather
than strict severity in healing the afflicted. But this principle
of conduct, treated by Nussbaum as the mark of the Stoic
practitioner, is along with their other practices a questionable
one. Jason pleads with Creon to keep Medea alive and the
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king is 'moved to mercy' by his tears (11.498-9). And, having
been 'merely banished', Medea pleads for mercy in staving
this off (11.286,498). Yet it is the mercy granted her that
enables her to go on to act without mercy.
'How can we tell which are the blessings and which are the
curses?' (1.684). In meditating on this question, the Chorus
expresses the uncertainty and vexation involved in establish-
ing moral values in a tumultuous world. Ambivalence about
the Stoic conception of a rational universe weaves its path
between the perspective of the cosmos and that of the
'citizen,.36
The medical analogy, which goes through only if this
conception of a rational universe is accepted, is employed by
the Stoic philosophers who themselves acknowledge a
distance from wisdom. Seneca tells us that analogy is the
means by which a conception of the good arises, and that its
antecedents are the 'observation' and 'combination' of
repeated acts. And so, in order to get from the inference that
there is such a thing as health of mind to the discovery of
what health of mind is, observation and combination are
required. But, given that the Stoics failed to locate concrete
examples of wise men (with the possible exception of
Epictetus on Socrates), it seems to follow that their criterion
of moral perfection falls short of itself, both at the universal
level and at the particular. It begins to look as if the Stoics
have been bitten by the poetic snake of encircling coils.
This is Nussbaum's verdict of what happens 'in the very
act of turning tragedy into a Stoic argument'. By character-
ising the Senecan outlook in terms of a 'moral asceticism'
and a 'realistic humanity', she argues that it is in conflict with
Stoic purity and detachment. Seneca's 'intense interest in
progress and striving' led him, she thinks, to 'attach to the
work and effort of philosophy a value hard to reconcile with
Stoicism'. And, she adds, it is by expressing his ideas in the
medium of poetry that Seneca is able to characterise the
ambivalence felt towards this work and this effort.37 However,
on top of the fact that the Stoics display a vigour comparable
with Seneca's own, it can be shown that the paradoxical
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character of Seneca's depiction already pervades their work.
By embracing Heraclitus's concept of a logos 'which directs
all things and which is shared by all things' and identifying
this as 'artistic' fire or 'intelligent pneuma', the Stoics
already sow the seeds for a marriage between reason and
passion. They would have been quite aware that their desire
to extirpate the passions was a desIre for an ideal, and one
that is practically unrealisable. Their statements, like the
statements of Seneca's characters, require qualification.
Nussbaum is, I think, right in saying that Seneca questions
the excellence of such an ideal existence. But, in treating
especially Medea's statements about herself as reliable and
transparent accounts of her own character, Nussbaum fails to
account for the uncertainty Seneca expresses about the
possibility of distinguishing between the Stoic and anti-Stoic.
It is this tendency to accept unqualifiedly the statements of
others that leads Nussbaum to adopt a narrow intellectualist
analysis of the Stoics, and also of Plato. Nussbaum points to
the Stoics' interest in quoting from and discoursing on
poetry, but she thinks that Stoicism bites itself once it uses
poetry to present its own arguments. And it is the danger of
stirring up the emotions that she thinks prompts Plato to ban
tragedy, and the poets, from the Republic. But must Socrates'
expressions of fear be taken at face value? In the Symposium,
he speaks of the way people make the mistake of giving the
name poetry to 'what is only one single aspect of it' (205b).
He expresses the nOlion that poetry 'in the true sense of the
word' involves 'calling something into existence that was not
there before, so that every artist is a poet' (205b-c).
For the Stoics, a rational being is able to depict the creative
and artistic intelligence of the cosmos through the
observation and combination of repeated acts. And their
writings are filled with analogies, similies, metaphors, and
other exempla required to gain and express an understanding
of the unified and dynamic nature of the individual and
universal soul. Without this use of concrete narrative and
exempla - the tools of poetry - their account of the human
soul in terms of reason and passion would no doubt be
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mistaken for a parts model. Plato makes ample use of this
tool as well, and it is through this and other tools of dialectic
(poetry being a species of dialectic for the Stoics38) that his
tripartite model of the soul can be made to look closer to the
Stoic one. But Nussbaum does not view it as such, and she
does not think of the writings of either Plato or the Stoics as
poetry.
What does this mean for the Stoic therapy of desire? One
thing it means is that the Stoic practitioner's diagnosis and
descriptions cannot be regarded as completely reliable or
transparent. In discussing the treatment of sickness and
disease, Nussbaum expresses the same caution, but in relation
to the patient's self-anal~sis. She observes that there are
many reasons for caution, 9 and yet when it comes to assess-
ing Seneca's suffering protagonist, she seems to overlook
these. Medea is a woman afflicted by strong and violent
passions that drive her to perform acts of murder. And yet
Nussbaum states that Seneca's use of her in his case against
love does not rest on falsity. Is Seneca to be read as depicting
the passions as true judgements? Would Nussbaum endorse
this reading? It looks as though Medea is not the only one
who is inconsistent with herself. And the way to establish
where other inconsistencies lie is through being watchful (one
of the Stoic virtues) of the accounts of both doctor and
patient. In fact, Nussbuam points out that the Stoics encour-
aged a relationship of symmetry between doctor and patient,
with each being able to question the other's accounts. And
this would be absolutely indispensable if it were to tum out
that the doctor was also in need of treatment. This was the
Stoics' belief, and it suggests that they were aware of the
paradoxical nature of their therapy. If there is some confus-
ion between who is doctor and who is patient, there will be
inevitable confusion about what judgements are true and
false, especially once it is granted that reason and passion
exist in such close proximity.
Seneca's Medea vividly depicts these Stoic paradoxes, and
in doing so expresses ambivalence towards both the Stoics'
ideal of health, and the methods used in aiming for this. But
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this is not the moment when Stoicism bites itself, since this
ambiguity was always already there. In contrasting 'myth'
and 'psychology' as the difference between 'genuine
tragedy and its counterfeit', Nietzsche might even have
suggested that Seneca was the paradigmatic Stoic.4o
Nussbaum's account both does and does not point to this.
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